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In the Supreine Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
CHARLES HINKSOX, 
Respondent, 
Respondent's Brief 
-vs.-
CAR:JIIN C. BOXAXXI, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
7210 
Respondent agrees with the statement of the case 
as set forth in appellant's brief with the exception of 
his statement concerning the second cause of action. In 
the second cause of action respondent's claim was not 
hased upon, 
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''A commission of 80% of the sales price on 
alleged sales of Christmas merchandise'' 
but was based on 80% of the premium sales price, that 
is, the difference between the standard price and a 
premium price for immediate delivery plus a commis-
sion of 5% on the standard price. 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
It will serve no useful purpose to summarize the 
facts as stated in the brief of appellant which takes 
the form of copying the record. There is no dispute 
concerning the following facts: 
1. During the period in question vVilliam W. Bar-
ton was sales ma·nager of appellant company and as 
sales manager was authorized to contact and employ 
other salesmen on commission. 
2. Barton in the course of his employment was 
authorized by appellant to employ respondent as a 
salesman. ( Tr. 73) 
3. The respondent was employed as a salesman hy 
appellant (question and answer to interrogatory no. 10 
of deposition and Tr. 156, 157). 
4. Orders taken by respondent in the course of 
employment which continued for approximately 10 
weeks were filled by appellant. 
5. Some commissions on orders taken "·rre paitl 
by appellant to respondent. 
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QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
It is the position of Respondent the Court by its 
judgment in effect granted respondent's motion to 
strike that part of the deposition which was based upon 
the business practice and customary procedure of the 
appellant. The motion to strike was made at the proper 
time and the Court at the conclusion of the case stated: 
"The court will consider that and leave that 
motion under adYisement pending the determina-
tion of the case." ( Tr. 203) 
In rendering judgment for respondent we assume 
that the Court granted respondent's motion and ex-
cluded this evidence; however, if there be any ambigu-
ity respondent hereby cross assigns as error the Court'B 
denial of the motion. 
Respondent's main argument '"ill be in reply to 
the three questions raised hy appellant and will take 
the follmving form: 
1. There was no error in admitting the testimony 
of respondent since all statements were made in the 
scope of the agency and were corroborated by other 
tP~timonies and facts. 
2. Substantial evidence adduced at the trial sup-
port~ findings of fact number 3 of the first cause of 
artion in support of the judgment. 
3. Suh~tantial evide>nee adduced at the trial sup-
ports the finding of fact~ nurnher 2 of the srrond cause 
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of action in support of the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ADMITTING 
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT. 
It is the opinion of respondent that appellant has 
confused the law in respect to the admission of the 
testimony of statements of an agent. The question 
here is not whether Barton was an agent of the appel-
lant and whether testimony of his statements should 
be admitted to prove this agency. There has been no 
denial that Barton was the agent. By the admission 
and testimony of the principal Barton was a sales 
manager authorized to employ salesmen and in the 
course of his employment employed appellant. There 
was no objection to the admissions of appellant that 
Barton was an agent and once having proved this 
agency the remaining questions were: 
1. Did Barton make the statements as an agent 1 
2. In making such statements was he acting with-
in the scope of his authority? 
In 2 Corp. J ur. 940, it is stated: 
"\Vhere the agency has been established hy 
independent evidence, the declarations of the 
agent are competent to show that he acted a:; 
agent and not on his individual account, or to show 
the nature and extent of his authority," 
Here the statements made in the preliminary ron-
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Yt>rsation and later by :J[r. Barton by telephone ·were 
not introduced for the purpose of establishing an 
agency but were for the purpose of showing the contract 
terms, of proYing the offer of employ1nent, the accept-
ance of the offer by the appellant, and the subsequent 
ratification of the contract after respondent affirmed 
the contract of employment as he was given to under-
stand it had been agreed upon. 
\Ye, therefore, submit that the following statement 
of the Law as found in Restatement of Law of Agency, 
section 284, volume 2, page 637 applies: 
"In actions between the principal and third 
parties, eYidence of a statement hy an agent is 
admissable for or against either party for the 
purpose of proving that such statement was 
made, if the fact that the statement was made 
constitutes, or is relevant in the proof of, one 
of the alternate fact~ to be established in order 
to maintain a cause of action or difference'' 
And as found in section 289, page 251 : 
''Evidence of statements of agents whether 
or not such statements are authorized, is ad-
missable in favor of and against the principal, if 
admissable under the general rules of evidence 
a~ to the admissability of such statements by such 
prrsons not agents.'' 
For the sake of argtunent, if we assume that Bar-
ton had instructions from his principal as to his limi-
tations in hiring new salesmen, there is no rule of evi-
(lrnee prohibiting the introrlurtion of tPsthnony con-
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cerning statements made by such an agent which might 
have exceeded such authority. Such a rule of law 
would defeat any claim whatsoever against a principal 
if the agent had exceeded his authority, and the prin-
cipal could thereby absolve himself of any liability by 
drawing up a strict limitation on the agent's authority, 
which limitations would not be known by the third party. 
From the evidence it is apparent that Barton was 
clothed with general authority and was in no way a 
limited agent. He was sales manager in charge of all 
salesmen of the company, had authority to employ new 
salesmen, in the scope of this authority he had hired 
many salesmen, had run an advertisement in a Salt 
Lake newspaper for the purpose of securing salesmen, 
had interviewed six salesmen, had employed respondent, 
had given respondent a four-day traning course, had 
supplied respondent with order books, samples, sta-
tionery, and later, credit rating information and had 
even after the termination of the employment attempted 
to employ respondent as District Supervisor. 'Ve sub-
mit that, in the first place, all of these facts conclusively 
prove that there was corroboration of the authority of 
Barton as an agent, and secondly they would be an in-
dication to any reasonable person draling with him 
that he had unlimited authority to rmploy salesmen in 
accordance with the statements and promises he made 
as an inducement to any salesmen he was attempting 
to employ. 
In admitting the statements of the agent the lowrr 
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It court was not in en'or but was following the law as 
adopted in this state by this court. The statements of 
the agent were admissable for the purpose of proving 
the contract and were necessary in order to establish a 
cause of action against the principal respondent. To 
haYe excluded this evidence on the ground that the 
statement went beyond his authority would have been 
in conflict with the rule of la-w as stated in the case of 
Harrison vs. Auto Securities Co. et al. 70 Utah 11, 257 
Pac. 677: 
"It is the general principle of the law of 
agency, running through on contracts made by 
the agents with third parties, that the principals 
are bound hy the acts of their agents ~which fall 
within the apparent scope of authority of thP 
agents, and that the principals will not be per-
mitted to deny the authority of their agents 
against innocent third parties, \Vho have dealt 
with those agents in good faith. That general 
principle of agency is universally recognized and 
applied by the Courts, and is laid down by evrry 
text-writer who has written upon the subject of 
agency." 
It is true that the principal testified in his deposi-
tion that the agent had specific and limited authority, 
hut aecordinp; to the testimony Barton did not testify 
that he had at any time told respondent that he was 
limited in his authority. 
The rules as set forth in Dohrman Supply Co. vs. 
Rrnu Brummell, 99 Utah 188, 103 Par. (2nd) 360 and 
Yarlnrr ,.s. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 45 Par. (2nd) 561, do 
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not apply because in those cases the third party knew 
he was dealing with ·a special agent with limited auth-
ority. Here the third party had a right to rely on state-
ments made by the -agent because they were within the 
apparent authority of the agent. Certainly an agent 
empowered to employ a salesman on commission would 
be authorized to set the rate of commission; likewise it 
would be within his apparent authority to designate the 
territory the salesman was to work in, and the type of 
customers he was to sell. All of these acts are within 
the apparent authority conferred upon an ·agent as 
that term has been defined in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Wolfe in the case of Skerl vs. vVillow Creek 
Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 Pacific (2nd) 507. 
"Apparent authority must be "apparent"; 
that is, the act in question which is done by the 
agent must be such an one which would seem to 
be within the purview of his actual authority. * * 
In other words, the work which the agent is really 
authorized to do must be such that the act which 
he does and in regard to which his authority i~ 
in question or reasonably connected with that 
work or authority which he actually ha~ or he 
cannot be apparently authorized.'' 
Evidently the lower court was of the opinion in 
answer to appellant's plea to sympathy on page 32 of 
his brief that a principal is in a position to protect him-
self under the circumstances related therein. It woulrl 
have been a simple matter for either the principal or 
agent to have insisted that as a condition to thr rm-
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ployment of respondent he must sign a contract sin1ilar 
to exhibit 8. This principal on the contrary made it pos-
sible for ·an agent to hold out any type of inducement 
to prospectiYe salesmen and then en1ploy such salesmen 
to their detriment. The evidence was that no contract 
was signed or received by the principal, yet the agent 
was considered to have been employed on September 
16th, and not until two months later was there any in-
dication that the principal would not perform in ac-
cordance with the terms of employment as previously 
stat.ed by the agent. The authorities ·are unanimous 
that any :principal that clothes such an agent with such 
authority and does not act to rescind such ,authority 
but on the contrary in effect ratifies the acts of the 
agent is bound by the acts of the agent. 
2. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT 
THE TRIAL SUPPORTS FINDING OF FACTS 
NO. 3 OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IN SUP-
PORT OF THE JUDG~iENT. 
Counsel for appellant has apparently conceded 
that they are bound by the following rule set forth in 
.Jensen vs. Logan City, 96 Utah 53, 83 Pacific (2nd) 311: 
''The rule is well established that it is not for 
this Court in a law case to weigh evidence or 
determine credibility of witnesses. If there is 
any substantial evidence in support of findings 
it must be sustained." 
'Ve suhmit that the testimony of respondent clearly 
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established a contract of employment which authorized 
respondent to pass upon credit after he had made an 
investigation of the credit responsibility of prospective 
customers. It is true appellant had the right to reject 
the order if the respondent had not offered credit ac-
cording to the instructions or the appellant had re-
ceived outside information that the customer was not 
a good credit risk. In other words there was substan-
tial evidence adduced ·at the trial that respondent was 
to determine the credit risk and appellant merely had 
the right to reject the order upon substantiation of p_oor 
credit. (Tr. 98 and 99, 122) 
There is no conflict in the evidence that respondent 
at all times followed the instructions as given to him 
by ~1:r. Barton in respect to credit. 
Q. '' "\V ere all orders you secured from the Com-
pany in accordance with general instruction,;.; 
and the agreement you had with Mr. Barton! 
A. Yes, Sir." (Tr. 99) 
Furthermore the evidence was not controvertrd 
that Barton led the respondent to believe that if he 
followed the credit instructions, accepted orders, that 
the orders would be filled unless there w·as justification 
for credit reasons not to fill the order. 
Q. "As a matter of practice you assumed that 
you would receive commission only on ordrr~ 
filled, didn't you~ 
A. I assumed all orders would hr filled or ~uh-
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stantial reason for credit given why not 
filled. 
Q. The rPaBon you were complaining was you 
had had orders turned down and no reasons 
stated at all·? 
A. X ot a reason at all. I had wanted specific ac-
countability." (Tr. 129) 
On December 6th ·when respondent received Ex-
hibit 7, there had been no disagreement on this phase 
of the contract; one order was cancelled because of a 
poor report from Dun & Bradstreet (Order #0841). No 
claim has been made for a commission on this order. 
X o complete accounting was tendered to respondent 
until the time of the trial when Exhibit 1 was submitted 
as part of the deposition. If we exa1nine this exhibit 
we at once recognize the fallacy of the argument of 
appellant. This is not a case where the salesman sold 
every prospective customer regardless of his credit 
standing. He went to great lengths to sell only those 
accounts which would be suitable dealers in the future 
and had established credit. Of the some $38,000.00 in 
orders taken, according to the account of ,appellant, 
they had justification for refusing only five accounts 
totaling $2,514.97, of which amount $1,024.50 was one 
account. Even on these accounts, which appellant claims 
WE'l'<' not good credit risks, no testimony was adduced 
to the effect that these accounts did not maintain the 
~tn.ndards specified by ~r r. Barton nor has appellant 
at any timP substantiated his reasons for denying the 
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account credit. In most of these cases the major part 
of the order was filled but for some unexplainable 
rea,son the balance of the, order was not accepted on 
the grounds that the customer was a good credit risk 
up to a certain point, but not beyond-the point of dif-
ference being only $100.00 or $200.00. 
We, therefore, submit that there is ample evidence 
in the record to sustain the lower Court's finding on 
this point. 
3. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT 
THE TRIAL SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF FACTS 
NU~IBER 2 OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIOX 
IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDG~IENT. 
\Ve would be inclined to ,agree with counsel for ap-
pellant that respondent's claim in his second cause of 
action "'ould be, ''preposterous on its face'', if the claim 
\Yere made as set forth by appellant. No claim has bern 
made, or is now made, that respondent is entitled to an 
80 per cent commission on the premium sales, that is, 
s,ales of hosiery made at a price in excess of the stan-
dard price. So that there will be no further misunder-
standing in regard to these premium sales we shall take 
liberty of summarizing the testimony as found_ in thr 
record in regard to these sales. 
Just before Christmas when the demand for hosirry 
is greater than at any other time and the supply is 
somewhat curtailed the retail merchant is willing to pay 
a premium for delivery of a shipmGnt oYer and allow 
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his ordinary quota if the shipn1ent is n1ade immediately. 
According to the testimony :Jlr. Barton authorized re-
spondent to charge certain select customers one or two 
dollars more as a premium or as '• an overage fee". It 
had been agreed upon between appellant's agent and 
respondent that respondent was to receive his 5 per 
cent commission on the normal price of such ~sales and 
was to receiYe in addition 80 per cent of the overage. 
Thus, if the salesman was succe~sful in selling a dozen 
hose originally priced at $16.20 per dozen for $18.70, a 
dozen for $13.90 originally priced at $12.90, and a dozen 
for $11.75 originally priced at $10.75, he was to receive 
not only 5 per cent on' the original price, but 80 per cent 
of $2.50, $1.00, and $1.00, the premium or overage on 
each sale. 
"r e submit that if appellant's counsel will re-study 
the transcript, he will have a more accurate under-
standing of this phase of the case. See particularly 
page 99. 
In response to demand for a bill of particulars 
plaintiff filed a statement of his account (Tr. 23, 24). In 
the second column of figures there has been segregated 
the overage fee on every order submitted. Exhibits D 
and E were introduced to prove this bill of particulars 
and as examples of the orders sent in by respondent 
and accepted by appellant. Included in these orders 
were premium sales totaling $36.00 on Exhibit D and 
$:21.00 on exhibit E. According to exhibit 7 of appel-
lant all hnt $35.25 (or three dozen hose) of the order 
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represented by exhibit D was accepted and the entire 1 1 
order represented by exhibit E was accepted including 
the pren1ium price charges of $18.70, $13.90, and $11.73. 
At the trial the Court was not inclined to have 
respondent go through every order taken at a price 
above the norm·al p~ice to prove that appellant had 
knowledge of this premium sales agreement, and had 
accepted the orders after receiving the proof of the 
excess price charged. Since there was substantial evi-
dence sufficient to convince the Court that there was 
a contract agreed upon between Barton and respondent, 
that orders were taken pursuant to s_uch contract, and 
the orders ·were accepted and some were filled, the 
Court felt justified in making a finding of fact in ac-
cordance with the complaint ·and bill of particulars. 
It is true that the evidence indicates respondent 
requested a confirmation from the principal of this 
agreement; however, according to the evidence there 
was a contract and he merely wanted the principal to 
confirm it before he expanded any more time and money 
in making such sales. In such a case as this we believr 
the rule adopted under similar facts in the ea~e of 
Peoples' ::\fercantile Company vs. Farmers' Cotton Fi-
nance Cqrp., 38 N. l\L 237, 31 Pac. (2nd) 252 applies. 
There the fact that an agent stated that he could not 
agree to commissions without consulting the principal, 
"might well have been interpreted as a rlevi('P 
to "stall", quite common in bargaining proee~RrR. 
Defendant, having confe1Ted ostensihlP authority 
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upon his agent and placed him in a position to 
mislead the plaintiff as to his authority, cannot 
thus eseape responsibility for plaintiff's having 
been misled. See Restatement, Agenry, 170." 
The record indicates that there was an agreen1ent 
for commission to be paid of 80 per cent, and orders 
were taken and accepted pursuant to this agreement. 
· The only thing that the respondent felt was in view 
of the fact that he had not been rredited with his com-
mission of 80 per cent on the first accounting submitted 
he was entitled to confirmation from the principal. Al-
though there is no proof that the principal confirmed 
this agreement, the record is clear that appellant bene-
fited by receiving 95 per cent of the overage, which 
benefit he is attempting to retain on the grounds that 
no contract whatsoever was made in respect to this 
overag·e. If, as claimed, there were no contract, there 
was a duty on the appellant to rescind the agreement 
or at least to advise respondent that the company would 
refuse to fill the orders at a premium price. 
4. ALL EVIDENCE CONCERNING APPEL-
LA~T 'S BUSINESS PRACTICES AND CUSTO-
JfARY PROCEDURES SHOULD HAVE BEEN EX-
CLUDED. 
During the trial the defendant attempted to intro-
duce ('\'i(lence as to his practice in employing other 
salesmen, the commissions they were paid, their limita-
tions on arcepting credit an(l the quota of orders they 
rould accept. Objections were timely made to the intro-
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duction of such evidence and for the most part the 
Court excluded this type of testimony; however, the 
Court did not rule upon plaintiff's motion to strike that 
part of the deposition which was objectionable on this 
count. Accordingly appeHant has based much of his 
argument on the premise that all of this evidence is 
admissable. 
We submit that the testimony clearly indicates that 
respondent was employed under an oral contract in 
order to accomplish an unusual assignment for appel-
lant. First he was to open a new territory, and if he 
were then successful, he was to become supervisor of 
the Western Region. Once it was established that an 
oral contract of employment had been agreed upon, all 
evidence regarding the customary practices of appellant 
was immaterial. See the case of Wade vs. Ford Motor 
Company, 151 Kan. 425, 99 Pac. (2nd) 775, where the 
Supreme Court of Kansas held that provisions of a 
customary agency contract in writing are no defense 
to an action based on an oral contract. 
Aside from this general rule it is worth noting· that 
although appellant seeks to justify his failure to account 
because the claim does not conform to his usual busi-
ness practices, he did not make the payments to re-
spondent in the usual manner. Mr. Barton testified that 
every salesman received $75.00 a week base pay and 
commission over and above this amount which would 
be :paid at the end of the month. Respondent, however, 
was paid a straight 5 per cent commission and at no 
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time receiYed $75.00 per week, but on the contrary was 
obligated to spend far in excess of this alleged amount 
as traveling expenses. If appellant had considered 
that Hinkson was just another salesman-employee, this 
fact could have been brought to respondent's attention 
by paying him weekly as was customary. Everything 
points to the fact that this was an unusual contract, 
that both parties knew that it was, and both parties 
expected it to work out more advantageously than the 
usual factory-traveling salesman arrangement. There-
fore, all the evidence in regard to the usual procedure 
should have been excluded. 
SUMMARY 
Based upon the testimony and the rules of Law it 
is clear that no reversible error was committed by the 
Lower Court in admitting all of the testimony of the 
statements of the agent. The authority of Barton as 
an agent having been duly established the Court was 
justified in allowing proof of his statements made in 
the apparent scope of his authority. The limits of the 
agent's authority were not to be determined by the in-
structions of his principal in New Jersey but by the 
statements he made, the reliance placed upon these 
statements by respondent, and the acquiesances and 
ratifications of the principal. 
The Lower Court was not and should not have 
heen concerned with the general practice of the appel-
lant and his other agency contracts. The only point at 
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issue was one particular oral contract involving out of 
the ordinary transactions.. _1 
There was substantial evidence· sufficient to sus-1 
tain the Lower Court's finding on all points at issue. l 
Accordingly the judgment of the Lower Court should l 
be affirmed. i 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHITE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ 
and ALVIN I. SMITH, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
'j 
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